This p(4)er introduces a framework for examining consumer and niarket problems as a function of consumer segment interaction patterns. Three patterns cf interactions are described as consisting of positive, negative, or no spillovers among consumer segments. The efficacy of regulatory remedies is shown to be affected by tiie type and extent ofthese interaction patterns. The paper complements and extends conventional aggregate cost-benefit (^proaches in Oiree ways: 1) by treating consumer interactions as a central feature of the mariiet system; 2) by focusing on how various interaction patterns affect Ae distribution and intensity of spillovers among consumers: and3) by describing how policy remedies can be used to facilitate or overcome Aese mteraction patterns.
A large volume of economic analysis evaluates regulation against the standard of economic efficiency. Proponents of economic efficiency argue that regulation should be undertaken only when the market fails [Mazis, Staelin, Beales and Salop 1981; Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978] . ^ From this perspective, the goal of intervention is restored effidency. Current policy focuses on aggregate efficiencies across strata of sodety arguing that regulation should be undertaken only if net benefits to buyers and sellers exceed net costs [Craswell 1985; Ford and Calfee 1986] .
The present paper introduces a framework for examining consumer policy remedy choice as a function of consumer interaction patterns. This framework complements and extends conventional cost-benefit analysis in three ways. First, although the effidency of regulatory remedies is important, their distribution of remedy costs and benefits or equity is also important [Crandell 1988; McCraw 1984; Meier 1985] . That is, if net benefits exceed net costs and certain consumers always reap the costs, the regulation is unfair, and fairness matters [Beauchamp and Bowie 1983; Kelman 1981; Rawls 1971] . Over the history of regulatory dedsion-making, policymakers have been concemed with both the equity and effidency of their dedsions and in cases of confiict, equity was viewed as more important [McCraw 1984] . Present dedsion-making approaches, induding costbenefit analysis, do not incorporate distributional considerations thereby limiting policymakers' acceptance of this approach [Crandell 1988] .Ŝ econd, cost-benefit analysis and its theoretical basis in economic theory, treats consumer interactions as operating outside the ideal theoretical model-a "deviation.*^ We treat these interactions as a central feature of both the best and worst of our economic system and argue that important equity and fairness issues are often the consequence of these interactions. For example, when the actions of one consumer negatively impacts another consumer, issues of consumer "entitlement" or rights arise [Calabresi and Melamed 1972; Donaldson 1982; Donaldson and Werhane 1982] .'' Third, the ideal theoretical economic model assumes perfect information, and recognizes infonnation asymmetry as a major obstade to effident operation of the maiket This approach focuses on correcting information asymmetry primarily throu^ the provision of information [Calfee and Ford 1988; Ippolito 1988] . This paper agrees that imbalances in the amount of information possessed by buyers and sellers can be offset in a variety of ways, but also acknowledges that these The Spectnim of Consunier Policy Remedy Choices infonnation asymmetries are unlikely to be eliminated. Hence, our framewoA focuses on the distribution and intensity of information asymmetries across consumer segments. These interaction patterns illustrate the need for both less and more restrictive regulatory remedies. Consequently, a full spectrum of policy choices from infonnation remedies (e.g., providing product information) to niarket restraint remedies (e.g., banning a potentially hazardous product) are ecamined. The next section describes in more detail the remedy options available to policymakers.
This paper is primarily concemed with interactions among consumers rather than interactions among buyers and sellers or among sellers. Obviously the interests of both sellers and buyers are important to policymakers [Mazis et aL 1981] . However, considering the distributional effects of regulatory dedsions on consumers makes the topic both more tractable and identifies issues that might go unnoticed in total maricet analysis.
Past research has tended to focus on consumer and market considerations affecting the design and implementation of infoirmatibn remedies or market restraint remedies [Capon and Lutz 1979; Federal Trade Commission 1979; Mazis et aL 1981] , and not on factors affecting choices between these classes of remedies. This section reviews the literature on remedies available to policymakers and current perspectives on their use. In the context of this paper, we restrict our attention to information, education, and market restraint remedies.Î n generaL there has been a movement away from market restraint remedies and toward information remedies [Bettman, Payne and Staelin 1986; Breyer 1982; Federal Ttade Commission 1979; Gage 1979; Hadden 1986] . Consequently, most recent research concerns how information remedies can be used effectively to alleviate market failures [Beales et aL 1981a; Day 1976; Federal Trade Commission 1979; Hadden 1986; Mazis et aL 1981; Mazis and Staelin 1982; Pridgen and Preston 1980; Wilkie 1982; 1987] . A more comprehensive perspective on remedy choice requires an understanding of how and where information flows in the marketplace, and when these flows are unable to support the use of information remedies for the benefit of all consumers. A discussion of education remedies is also induded because they may frequently be appropriate for remedying seller-buyer information asymmetries and negative consumption spillovers. The remainder of this section reviews a more detailed continuum of regulatory remedies by documenting differences among information, maiicet restraint, and education remedies and presenting finer distinctions within each remedy type.
Information Remedies
The Federal Trade Commission [1979] has proposed a restrictiveness continuum separating infonnation remedies into two categories: those seeking to increase the number of speakers providing information (speaker remedies), and those affecting the content of the information provided by sellers (message remedies) [pp. 184-89] . Speaker remedies attempt to increase the flow of information to consumers by relying on maricet forces with minimal government interference [Pridgen and Preston 1980] . These remedies include increasing the number of advertisers by removing state laws, voluntary codes of trade associations, and professional codes of ethics that impede the flow of information. As a result of this increased information, these remedies reduce consumers' search costs and facilitate comparative shopping.^ However, in some situations the lifting of formal restrictions to produce information fails to increase the amount of information available. For example, in many local markets, sodal factors exert presstire to maintain prices and restrict the flow of information such as in the provision of real estate, medicaL and funeral services [Pridgen and Preston 1980] .
Market Restraint Remedies Education Remedies
Message remedies, on the other hand, directly constrain the type of information sellers can provide and are therefore viewed as more restrictive than speaker remedies. One class of message remedies, affirmative disdosures, requires firms to inform potential customers of negative product or service facts they might otherwise fail to disseminate [VMde 1986] . Therefore, message remedies may also increase the amount of information in the marketplace. However, because the seller can often avoid the disdosure requirement by changmg the product claim, message remedies may not increase information [Pridgen and Preston 1980] . Market restraint remedies constrain the level of quality firms offer to the market [Stem and Eovaldi 1984] . Thus, maricet restraint remedies can involve banning or restricting the manu&cture, sale, and/or use of products and services in the marketplace. These remedies are appropriate vihea weaknesses in market forces can not be suffidently mitigated, at a reasonable expense, by promoting information flows. Market restraint may also be necessary if the probability or consequences of risk posed by product use are too high and choice is deemed inappropriate (e.g., the use of flammable children's pajamas) or when the possibility of spillovers requires collective dedsion-making and action (e.g., dumping pollutants) [Hadden 1986 ].
Education remedies attempt to provide concepts and explanations that enable consumers to choose more effectively [Thorelli and Thorelli 1977, pp. 24-25] . Like information remedies, education remedies seek to restore the equality between buyers and sellers. However, the basic underlying philosophies of these remedies differ. Education remedies are most usefid when consumers are without the requisite knov«dedge and skills to use information and the mere increase of infonnation does nothing to foster these capabilities (cf., Moorman [1988] for a discussion of the failure of nutrition information programs). However, sometimes the disparity between buyers and seUers can not be eliminated because educating consumers is too expensive or time-consuming. In such cases, maricet restraint remedies may be necessitated
The Effect of Consumer Interaction Patterns on Policy Remedy Choice
Poiicy decisions rest on assumptions about the nature and type of interactions among consumer segments [Capon and Lutz 1979; Day 1976; Feick, Herrmann and Wariand 1986; Ford and Calfee 1986; McCollou^ and Best 1980] . This paper introduces a framework for e3q)lidtty analyzing the relationship between consumer interaction patterns and policy remedy dioice. Virtually no research or theory has directly addressed this relationshqx The appropriateness of policy remedies across three types of consumer segment interaction (or spillover) patterns is examined. The three types of consumer segment interaction patterns considered are as follows: 1) positive interactionsthe actions of one segment of consumers and/or govemment or firm activities spill over to affect other segments in positive ways; 2) negative interactions-the actions of one segment of consumers and/or govemment or firm actions directed to one segment of consumers spill over to harm or restrict the choices of other consumers; 3) incomplete interactions-the actions of one segment of consumers and/or govemment or firm actions do not spill over to either positively or negatively affect other consumers.Î nteractions among consumers may be relatively direct as when one consumer offers a recommendation to another about where to get the lowest price on a product [Price, Feick and Higie 1987] In choosing consumer policy remedies to overcome or facilitate these interaction patterns, this framework adheres to the current policy orientation of favoring less government interferences and less restrictive remedies. Consequently, within each of three types of interaction patterns (positive, negative, and incomplete), policy remedies are examined in terms of their ability to correct consumer and market problems by enhancing the flow of infonnation (speaker and message remedies), improving consumers' kno\(dedge/skin base (education programs), or lastly, by restricting market offerings (market restraint remedies). can be viewed as designed, in part, to create and maintain an informed segment in the maricet'" Finally, because information sensitive consumers are motivated to police the market [Thorelli and Engledow 1980] and to diffuse market information to other consumers [Price, Feick and Higie 1987] , policy should promote and facilitate these motivations. For example, public service messages encourage consumers to report bad business practices to the Better Business Bureau (Le., policing activities) and messages could encourage consumers to share their infonnation with other consumers (Le., diffusing activities). By targeting information sensitive consumers with desired information, facilitating policing activities, and encouraging diffusing activities, policymakers can increase both the ratio of informed to total consumers and their impact in the marketplace.'P olicymakers may also rely on information remedies because they anticipate that the infonnation will have a direct effect on sellers whose activities will benefit consumers. In this case, sellers anticipate the vigilance of information sensitive consumers and respond without evidence of altered consiuner behavior [Padberg 1977] . After examining the open dating program, Padberg conduded, "the benefits which accrue to the consumer ftom this program may be more related to the sensitivity it stimulates on the part of the distributors rather than the sensitivity consumers exhibit directly" [p. 7] . In other cases, the seller may not transform the market by altering product offerings, but instead by altering their interactions with consumers. For example, the provision of information on mortgage rates works throu^ real estate agents who directed homebuyers to institutions with the lowest rates [Olshavsky 1988, p. 232] . In both situations, policy remedies affect consumers via their direct effect on sellers.
Even in markets characterized by positive interactions among consumer segments, circumstances may cause policymakers to rely on more restrictive remedies, induding restricted access to the product or removal of the product from the market Two such circumstances, discussed below, are when technological change makes information solutions impractical and where the time lag for the natural operation of maricet mechanisms is unacceptable.
Information solutions may be impractical when the rate of technological change is high and it is difficult to maintain an adequate amount of knowledge to make informed dioices. Preston and Bloom [1986] summarize this perspective by stating, "Paradoxically, the goals of adequate information and wise choice are made more difficult not easier, by the contemporary explosion of new technologies and products" [p. 45] . Therefore, the dedsion to use information remedies should be made with awareness of the rate of technological change in the environment Second, informational solutions may be impractical if there is a substantial lag between informed consumers' dioices or protests and sellers' reactions. For example, informed consumers can do littie in the case of the fly by ni^t operation because by the time their protests are registered, substantial harm has been incurred by many consumers and the culprits have left town. Policyinakers must assess the costs and benefits of allowing for problem correction through the natural operation of market mechanisms. This assessment involves the policyinakers' considerations of sodet/s ability to tolerate certain risks or sodety's desire to uphold certain moral standards. If the time lag poses risks that policymakers dedde are morally unbearable, then more restrictive remedies (induding banning the product) may be endorsed
In sum, M^en a positive interaction occurs, the actions of informed consumers improve the lot of uninformed consumers. However it is equally possible that informed consumers' choices may stimulate the market in ways that are detrimental to other consumers' welfare. For example, informed consumers' demands for more infonnation may result in information remedies requiring additional cognitive effort and seardi costs for average consumers [Bettinan 1975; Jacoby 1974] . Similariy, because activist consumers are not representative of all consumers, government and firm actions to meet their demands may be inappropriate [Moyer 1984; Wally, Dickey and Talarzyk 1977] . Therefore, policymakers should be careful to anticipate and assess how policy remedies aimed at facilitating positive interactions affect uninformed and nonactivist consumers. The next two sections de-
Negative Consumer Segment Interaction Patterns

When Products and Programs Targeted for Some Consumers Adversely Affect Other Consumers
Policy Considerations scribe how differences among constuner segments can affect the likelihood of incomplete and negative interaction patterns.
A negative interaction implies that what beneflts one consumer harms another or adversely affects their choices. Negative interactions may restilt from: 1) firm or government programs and products targeted for one consumer segment that spill over to harm another segment; or 2) consiuner choices that spill over to harm others who do not choose (e.g., third-party effects). Negative interaction patterns raise complex issues about how to trade off benefits to some consumers against harm to others. A discussion of the two kinds of negative interaction patterns as they relate to policy remedy choices follows.
Consumers exhibit different levels of awareness and comprehension of product information and product risks. These differing levels of attention and comprehension may mislead consumers to buy the product and incur harm (Le., increase their materiality) [Beales, Craswell and Salop 1981]. When these differences are not accounted for in government and finn activities, negative interactions are likely to occur. Craswell [1985] argues that virtually all advertising can be viewed as misleading for some consumers and informative for others. In product safety and advertising deception judgments, the extent of negative interaction between a target market and various submarkets is of crudal importance [Ford and Calfee 1986 ]. An example of the complexity of assessing the interactions between consumers with differing levels of awareness and materiality is contained in the case of chain saws [Pittle 1988 ]. Chain saws are plagued by a 'Idckback" problem and most manufacturers provide clear instructions to purchasers about the problem. However, kickback accidents sdll occur about 23,000 times a year, prestimably because many consumers do not read the instructions or fail to understand or follow them. In this case, although many liability suits are brou^t, no chain saw distributor has been successfully sued. One market restraint remedy, mandating the inclusion of a safety dp at ^e end of the saw, would greatly reduce the number of accidents that occur. However, the tip also reduces the effectiveness of the chain saw. In this case, by either allowing the product to remain as is or using a market restraint remedy, a negative interaction occurs. In the first case, the informed consumer benefits and the uninformed does not; in the latter case, the imposition of the product standard penalizes the informed consumer segment who reads and follows the instructions.
When sellers or the government offer information or products that are desired and useful for the target segment, yet may have detrimental effects on other portions of the maricet, policy remedy dedsions can take three forms: 1) segment isolation, 2) segment education or 3) maricet restraint Segment isolation may be accon:q}lished in two ways. First, consumers could be allowed to screen themselves. This would imply that firms do a better job of letting target consumers know v^o should listen to their messages and/or who should buy their prxxlucts. For example, whea manu&cturers attempt to restrict toy usage or movie viewing to specified age groups, consumers are being allowed to screen themselves or their children from potential harm.
Second, vulnerable submaricets could be restricted &om having access to potentially misleading information and/or potentially harmful products (e.g., restricting where information is published and products are distributed). These restrictions must be undertaken with considerable caution because the possibility for discrimination exists (see our discussion of discrimination in the section on incomplete interactions). As an example, suppose economically disadvantaged consumers suffer substantial injury because they misuse kerosene and other
When the Choices of Some Consumers Affect Other Consumers
Who Do Not Choose space heaters. However, if used correctly, these products arc quite safe and benefit consumers by rcdudng their heating costs. If a segment isolation strategy werc selected and these consumers were not allowed to purchase certain types of heaters, the fcumess of the rcmedy could be questioned because it rcstricts one segment's right to choose. Moreover, even when discriminatory effects are deemed acceptable, it may be e^ctremely difficult and expensive to restrict communication and/or product distribution to targeted consumers. Another general strategy for alleviating negative interactions is to educate the harmed segment Education rcmedies, in this case, may involve collecting and prcsendng infonnation to these consumers to help them minimize the threat of present and future harm. Consumer eduction classes, neis^iboiiiood groups, and other informal means of incrcasing the knowledge and skill level of these consumers may be effective. Planned change programs have successfully used educationally strategies when the objective is to heighten awarcness of a problem and its solution, but also suggest ch^e will not occur tinless the target group is also hi^y motivated [Zaltman and Duncan 1977] . Planned change rcsearch also recommends that information disseminated to educate constimers should be channelled throu^ the gatekeepers and influential members of the harmed segment Barriers to successfully using education strategies exist v^en the harmed segment has no formal education, is geographically dispersed, and is rcsistant to the idea of self-help.
I^ however, segment isolation or education strategies arc not successful in rcdudng negative spillovers among segments, it may be necessary to rcstrain the maricet by prohibiting information or the product altogether. An especially dramatic example of this problem is infant milk formula distribution to underdeveloped countries [Post 1985; Post 1986; Post and Baer 1978] . "^ Experience has shown that elite consumers in these countries can effectively use the milk formula without difficulty and derive many medical advantages firom its distribution. However, mass distribution of the formula has proven dangerously ineffective because most consumers lack dean water and the education to use the formula correctly. These negative interactions rcsulted in the Worid Health Organization putting forth the International Code of Maricedng Breast MiQc Substitutes rcstricdng the naturc of these marketing activities in underdeveloped countries. ^^ In this case, market restraint has the attendant problem of crcating negative rcpercussions for the infonned segment That is, because certain consumers misuse the product access is rcstricted for everyone.
Similar situations now exist in Third Worid countries as hazardous pesticides and tinsafe Pharmaceuticals enter these uninformed and unrcgulated markets [Reich 1988 ]. In these cases, a variety of political, economic, sodal, and cultural factors increase the difficulty of distributing and promoting products to only that portion of the population (either within or between countries) who can safely use the products [Silverman 1976; . This difficulty increases dramatically outside the U.S. wherc very effective, informal means of distribution often operate to undermine safe and consdendous distribution. Morcover, negative interactions arc more likely because segment differcnces arc often greater and based on a greater number of dimensions (e.g., education, language, experience, culturc). In these situations, market rcstraint remedies mi^t be morc appropriate than either a segment isolation or education strategy.
A differcnt kind of problem occurs when the choices of one constimer adversely affect other consumers who do not choose. Therc arc numerous examples of this problem (e.g., parcnts' choices affect their childrcn, smokers' choices affect nonsmokers, drunk drivers' choices affect sober drivers) [Dardis 1980] . The problem is one of some constuners' self-serving choices spilling over to affect other indi-viduals in ways that they or others perceive as unacceptable." This perception follows from the individuals' beliefs that a spedfic mode of conduct or end-state of existence is prcferable to other modes or end-states [Rokeach 1973, p. 5] . We use the term "Value confiict" to describe these differences in their beliefe [Buchholz 1985] .
PolUy Considerations
When individual values diverge and negative interactions rcsult therc is market ineffidency because the cost of a good to one individual is less than the cost of a good to another or to sodety. The cost-benefit approach tries to rcsolve this problem by creating policy that sets the good's market price equal to its sodal price. To calculate this social price, policymakers assess the expected value of harm imposed on some consumers by others' self-serving choices [Arrow 1977 ]. This approach is fraught with the difficulties of assigning market values to sodal costs and benefits. For example, under a strict Parcto improvement criteria, regulators would value low income lives less than hi^er income lives. However, this runs counter to our beliefe about equality, especially if the poorcr person has not willinj^y assumed a particular risk [Crandell 1988, p. 68] .^ Thus, cost-benefit analysis makes in^lidt judgments about what is £air and just for differcnt members of sodety. This paper suggests that policymakers es^lidtfy indude issues of fairness, justice, and equity in their policy dioices. Doing so raises tough questions about the vahie of life and what is acceptable and unacceptable risk [Fischoff et aL 1981] . However, we agrce with Crandell [1988] who argues that too much time has been spent debating the value of life and making assessments of risk, and not enough attention has been given to the choicie of policy rcmedies when individual values conflict A second policy approach that holds promise for long-term, cost-effective rcsohidon of value conflicts is one that motivates constimers affecting others to voluntarily incorporate them into their utility ftmctions [cf., Lynne and Oldenquist 1986] . Velasquez [1982] strcsses the in:q)ortance of this approach when he points out that "a sodet/s system of moral standards will identify situations in which each person must rcstrain his or her self-intercst in order to securc a system of conduct that is mutually advantageous to everyone" [p. 11] . This approach reprcsents an optimal policy objective because it allows individuals to exerdse tiieir freedom of choice widiout harming fellow consumers and it is consistent with policymakers' preference for less interference in marketplace activities. Thus, some of the most important issues in rcgulating negative interactions may center on identifying critical factors that fadlitate this objective. Three issues that take on particular significance in this rcgard arc: consumers' connectedness or relatedness, the naturc of value commitments, and the costs of changing behavior.
Some theory and rcsearch has focused on the importance of consumer connectedness in motivating altruistic behavior [cf., Batson, in prcss; Clark 1984; Lemer 1982; Oldenquist 1982] . We have identified three subfactors affecting constimers' perceptions of their connectedness to others: 1) blood rcladonship; 2) emodonal proximity or doseness (e.g., friendship) and; 3) spiritual or religious convicdons (e.g.. We arc one in the Father). Consumers will display their connectedness to others rcladve to the degrce that they display these types of rcladonships or hold these types of convicdons. As Rescher [1983] notes:
. . . human nature being what it is, we so operate in the context of our personal afEairs as to value the interests of people differentially, varying with their proximity to or remoteness from us: be they reladons, friends and neighbors, colleagues and acquaintances, fellows who share some professional or cultural affinity, or "perfect strangers" with whom we have little or nothing in common [p. 160].
Thereforc, connectedness can provide the radonale for incorporating others into one's prcfercnces. Riturc rcsearch should be directed at understanding these factors and how they affect the degree to which consumers have concern for others.
The second factor infiuendng whether an individual incorporates others into his/her dedsion-making is the naturc of certain value commitments. This can occur in two important ways. First if consumers believe that committing a pardcular behavior upholds or negates something they value, it will morc than likely affect their interacdons with other consumers. For example, if a smoking consumer values the freedom of choice, it is likely that they will rcsist rcstricdng their behaviors to benefit others [Frank 1987] . Second, the prcsence of one spedfic value-the caring for others at the expense or sacrifice of individual gain may be an important determinant of remedy dioice.
A foal factor affecting the indusion of others in dedsion-making is the consumers' costs of altering their choices and behaviors. These costs may indude, among others, the monetary, emodonal, and dme expenditurcs of searching for and adopting alternative behaviors or choices, and changing habits. The cost of changing behaviors is largely affected by the amount of change rcquircd. As two consumers' value differcnces increase, the costs to either of them of changing their choices to accommodate the other also incrcases."* If incorporating the preferences of others incurs few costs, then even rcladvely rcmote, unconnected others may be induded.
Examples may help clarify how policy rcmedies arc chosen to ameliorate value confiicts using these pdndples. Consider the cases of the smoking prcgnant woman and the smoking co-worker. In both cases, therc exists a value confiict problem-the mother affecdng her child and the co-woricer affecdng his/her colleagues in ways that may harm them. It is morc likely that the smoking prcgnant woman has stronger measurc of connectedness to her child than the smoking coworker has for his/her colleagues. Thercforc, therc is a high probability that the mother can be motivated to incorporate the effect on her child and stop smoking. As a rcsult informadon and educadon rcmedies should be effecdve in rcmedying the situadon induding the use of warning labels describing how "low fetal birth wei^ts" can rcsult from smoking, advertisements, and pamphlets distributed throu^ obstetricians and hospital educadon programs.
The case of the smoking co-worker has had differcnt policy outcomes. In major ddes all over the United States, policymakers arc dedding that the health risks posed by smokers arc high and iheir consumpdon behaviors should be rcstricted. To remedy the problem, many ddes arc passing public health rcguladons forbidding smoking in public places, induding places of employment or rclegadng smoking to designated areas. Because of the lower degree of connectedness and the perceived hig^ costs to the smoker of voluntarily accommodating the nonsmoker, policymakers appropriately dedded therc was a low probability of informadon rcmedies workiig, and morc rcstricdve remedies werc selected.
As these examples suggest negadve interacdons and the value confiicts that create them bring policymakers up against some of the most difficult issues in social choice and interpersonal comparisons of utility." These issues include v^ether to uphold the frcedom to make choices that impact others in negadve ways and when and to what extent policy should protect those who arc negadvely affected by others. In considering rcmedies for this type of interacdon, policymakers need to be awarc that they arc making statements about sodety's objectives and moral standards. Morcover, this analysis suggests that for the broad spectrum of value confiict problems, policy rcmedy choice should consider assessments of consumer connectedness, liie nature of consumer value commitments and the costs to offending consumers for changing their behaviors. These
Incomplete Interaction
Patterns and Isolated Consumer Segments questions and their implications go well beyond cost-benefit analysis and suggest a radically different perspective on consumer policy choice.", In this section we investigate the antecedents to and consequences of consumer isolation in the marketplace. Segment isolation describes situations where the actions of one segment of consumers or government and/or firm activities directed to one segment of consumers do not spill over to affect other segment(s).^ We do not reconsider the benefits of incomplete interactions and isolated consumers discussed as a policy remedy to negative interactions, although isolation created to ameliorate harm can also have discriminatory implications. Instead we focus on cases where the benefits of market effidency do not accrue to consumers because they are isolated. Several researchers have noted factors that inhibit the benefits received by one segment from accruing to other segments or from one segment to other segments [d., Andreasen 1977; Png and Hirschleifer 1986; Salop 1977; Salop 1986; Telser 1965] . These factors are summarized as: 1) heterogeneous abilities or characteristics; 2) heterogeneous environments; and 3) heterogeneous preferences. All three factors are potential causes of isolation because they inhibit information flows among consumers and sellers are able to differentiate among consumers on their basis. Once this differentiation has occurred, it is possible for sellers to discriminate among consumers providing differential prices, services, or even product access. We will define discrimination and comment on its market effects following a discussion of three factors that may result in consumer differentiation.
One of the most powerful bases for inhibiting the diffusion of benefits among consumer segments occurs v^en maricets are separated by personal characteristics such as the wealth of the purchasers. For example, early research demonstrated that "gjietto consumers" paid higher prices for goods than suburban shoppers [cf., Caplovitz 1967; Sturdivant 1968; Wimmer 1981] . Other distinguishable consumer characteristics, in addition to the standard array of sodoeconomic, race and gender characteristics, can lead to isolation. The FTC [1979] indudes the elderiy with a hearing loss, balding men, and non-English speaking shoppers as examples of consumers who may be vulnerable because of their special characteristics.
Second, environment heterogeneity or the characteristics of shopping environments combined with 3 consumers' lack of mobility can lead to isolation. Considerable research has suggested that by force of psychological and physical mobility barriers, many consumers shop in fragmented, deteriorated, overpriced and understocked geographic maricets with narrower assortments [cf., Andreasen 1971; Cox 1969] . Unfortunately, if informed consumers shop in different markets than isolated consumers, informed choices may not be refiected in the isolated markets [Andreasen 1976] .
Finally, consumer isolation may not result from buyer characteristics or merchant exploitation, but rather, very different preferences [Sowell 1981] . Preference heterogeneity describes variations across consumers' tastes and preferences [Dickson and Ginter 1987; Price, Feick and Higie, forthcoming] . Andreasen [1975] supports the notion of preference heterogeneity as being a cause of consumer isolation, over and above buyer characteristics. Andreasen also states that it is a common Macy to assume that isolated consumers are like other consumers except they have less income, less education, larger families and so oa He notes these consumers' special characteristics result in special problems such as unstable income, different tastes and preferences, poweriessness, and need for social gratification. These problems, in turn, can cause informed consumer and isolated consumers to shop different markets leading to the same market separation that would be implied by physically distant markets (see Phlips [1983] and Schwartz and Wilde [1982; for discussions of markets differentiated by quality). For example, certain low quality retailers and products may be exdusively preferred by uninformed consumers, and hence not benefit from the policing and diffusing activities of informed consumers.
Any time consumers can be differentiated on the basis of heterogeneous characteristics, environments, or preferences, the opportunity exists to discriminate, L e., to make a distinction in favor or against one person as compared with another. Sellers can discriminate between segments of consumer in the provision of product-related services, access to products, or pricing. For example, the better dressed gentleman may receive better service, children are not allowed into certain movies, and the poor or uninformed consumer may pay more.
Discrimination is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It is neither good nor bad, but it always raises issues of market inequities and ineffidendes. One significant form of discrimination used against isolated segments is price discrimination. Price discrimination exists when two varieties of a commodity are sold to different consumers at different net prices where the net price is corrected for the cost assodated with product differentiation [Phlips 1983 ].
We focus on two types of price discrimination: preference-based and characteristic-based. Preference-based price discrimination occurs ^dien consumers are charged a premium for their preferences, often unjustified by cost differences. For example, busmess travellers who choose not to stay over Saturday ni^t, consumers vAio prefer name brand dothing, and consumers who prefer the convenience of credit cards over lower-interest loans. In contrast, examples of characteristicbased price discrimination indude selling Disneyland entrance tickets at a discount to senior ddzens, children or military personnel, or using a sliding scale based on customer income to price medical services.
In many cases price discrimination is used to cross-subsidize various consumer groups (e.g., wealthier patients pay more to subsidize poorer patients). Although this practice remains controversial and raises serious equity issues, some research provides support for the practice in terms of improved social wel&re [Crompton and Lamb 1986; Sawhill 1988] . In many other cases, discriminatory practices are designed to take advantage of consumer isolation b such a way as to differentially worsen their outcomes with no offsetting gain to other consumers in the marketplace. Several illustrations are discussed.
Merchants able to differentiate among consumers on any of the dimensions described above can systematically discriminate against them by using tactics that meet their special needs or circumstances. For example, Andreasen [1975] notes the special susceptibility of low income consumers to certain low price tactics, free gimmicks and fear appeals. Sellers exploit this susceptibility by employing these tactics in places shopped by predominantly low income consumers [Caplovitz 1974] . While some of these practices are perfectly legal, they are simply not effective v/hea used with informed consumers. Other seller practices may be of questionable legality or illegal, but because consumers are not policing these markets, the practices may go undetected.Ĉ onsumers can also be discriminated by their cost of infonnation [cf., Jeuland and Narasimhan 1985; Rosenthal 1980; Shilony 1977; Varian 1980] . One common seller tactic used is the offer to "match" or "beat" a competitor's price. This seller mechanism systematically discriminates between informed and uninformed buyers and at the extreme may drive prices to monopoly levels [Plott 1981; Png and Hirschleifer 1986; Salop 1977; Salop 1986] . Using this mechanism, a seller can set a hi^ list price for uninformed buyers, but still retain informed buyers through offers to match price. Salop [1977] has described this type of discrimination as creating a two-price equilibrium in the marketplace with loiowledgeable consum-ers pajring one price and unknowledgeable or uninformed consumers paying another.
Informational price discrimination is troublesome because research has demonstrated that most consumers perform very low levels of search [Meier 1985; Price et aL 1987] . Hence, business practices to take advantage of informationally separate markets can have profound, distorting effects on price-quality offerings in the maricet [Schiwartz 1977] . For example, prescription drug price disdosures for the same quality drug were reported to be as much as five times that charged by another druggist in the same community [Federal Tirade Commission 1979] .
Policy Considerations A major implication of incomplete interactions is that policymakers can not rely on information remedies that target the informed consumer segment. With incomplete interactions, the benefits of the information sensitive consumers' search, choices, and complaints do not spill over to isolated segments [Schwartz and Wilde 1985] . Two general strategies might be pursued by policymakers faced with isolated consumer segments (see Tkble 1). One strategy is to find ways to complete the networic of interactions between informed and isolated consumer segments. We identify three approaches to increasing interactions among consumers. First, sellers can be offered incentives to treat maricets as if they are common. Theory holds that if incentives are offered to at least some sellers who treat the markets as if they are common, the effects of discriminatory tactics of other sellers will deteriorate [Phlips 1983 ]. For example, retailer subsidies to operate in ^etto areas may have the effect of driving unscrupulous retailers to change their tacdcs or go out of business. Although the approadi holds promise and wide appeal, more work is needed to demonstrate feasible implementations of incentive programs [Gamse 1982] .
Another means of completing the network of interactions between segments is to offer consumers incentives to treat markets as if they were common. Isolated consumers could be encouraged to shop the same retailers as informed consumers by increasing their physical mobility throu^ incentives such as free buses to non-ghetto shopping areas. Although these incentives may eliminate certain barriers to common markets, other barriers (such as monetary constraints that force these consumers to shop low-quality maricets) are likely to remaia Finally, interactions between informed and isolated consumer segments could be increased by facilitating forums for consumer communications. For example, if informed consumers made public the "low price" paid in a local market then the seller "match price" discrimination mechanism could be circumvented. Because infonnation sensitive consumers are often motivated by a desire to police the market [Tliorelli and Engledow 1980; Thorelli and Thorelli 1977] , easily accessible forums for buyer information exchange could reduce the effectiveness of at least some mechanisms for buyer discrimination [Maynes, Morgan, Vivian and Duncan 1977] . A number of independent information providers do exist in the United States and Europe to provide such a forum [Murphy and Ross 1987; . Most do not provide local market information and so have restricted applicability to some of the problems of discrimination just discussed. However, recent services such as Washington Consumers' Checkbook and the Bay Area Consumers' Checkbook combine local price and product quality information [Hartjens 1983; Ippolito 1988] .
When differing preferences are the cause of consumer isolation, it may be difficult to facilitate common maricets. This is true because if consumers prefer different products or different shopping areas, there is no basis for information exchange [Price, Feick and Higie, forthcoming] . In these circumstances, the general strategy should be to reduce discrimination against the isolated consumer segments. Two approaches mi^t be used. First, policy tni^t be directed at creating an informed consumer group within the isolated segment to increase the likelihood of subsequent positive interactions.^ An experiment performed in Europe found that providing consumers with subscriptions to the German version of Consumer Reports actually turned them into "information seekers" who made greater use of all kinds of infonnation sources [Kaas and Tolle 1981; Olander 1988] .
Over the long-term, consumer education programs and consumer activist groups may serve to drctimvent seller discrimination tactics by creating a policing group within the isolated segment However, in the short term, a second approach based on more restrictive remedies may be required. This second approadi would be directed at identifying and circumventing seller discrimination tactics. As one illustration, sellers who offer to match price might be required to disclose information about variability in prices obtained by all buyers (Le., message remedies). Or sellers may be restrained from certain types of practices. On a cautionary note, however, ^e imposition of remedies at odds with the special circumstances and preference fimctions of these groups may simply drive exploitive merchant practices underground (e.g., loan sharks, etc) [Andreasen 1975] .
In general, the greater the gap between informed and uninformed consumers' characteristics, envirorunents, and preferences, the greater the potential to discriminate and the more likely that market restraint remedies will be required. When viewed on both a national and ^obal scale, surmounting the problems of discrimination in isolated segments throtig^ information and education seems virtually impossible at least in the short-term. Several researchers have argued that as consumers are unable to protect themselves via information and education, market restrain remedies should become a policy priority, if product-related acddents are to diminish [Allain 1988; Kinsey 1988; Reich 1988; Singer 1975] .
Conclusions This paper proposes a firamework for analyzing constuner and market problems and policy remedy choices in terms of interactions or spillovers among consumer segments. An important distinction between this approach and previous theory and research is the recommendation that remedies should be evaluated on their ability to fedlitate or overcome these interaction patterns. This approach encourages a consumer segment orientation over a total market effects orientation; this suggesting that policymakers scan the marketplace for evidence of isolated segments and segments receiving negative repercussions from policy actions that transform the marketplace in otherwise positive ways. By suggesting policy alternatives for positive, negative, and incomplete consumer segment interactions, this paper goes beyond past efforts. Past efforts provide only descriptive analyses of incomplete interactions (e.g. "disadvantaged" consumers living in depressed markets) and focus very generally on negative interactions. However, because policymakers must have the ability to arbitrate and resolve these problems, this paper attempts to tmderstand the antecedents to and consequences of negative and incomplete segment interactions. We argue that policymakers should systematically assess what type of interaction patterns exist and then consider ways of manipulating that pattern by channeling remedies throu^ that pattern to affect desired outcomes.
This paper posits that research on aggregate costs and benefits needs to be complemented by research on the distributional consequences of regulation. Most fundamentally, we argue that these distributional consequences are often outcomes of partictilar patterns of consumer interactions. As Harrison [1981] notes, "... while aggregate efficiency analyses may form the bedrock of economic analyses for regulatory policy, distributional analyses constitute an important, and somewhat ne^ected complement" [p. 196] . Research into interaction patterns and distributional effects makes several major contributions. First, such research decreases obstacles to effident and effective regulations. For example, it could identify seller tactics that serve to separate and discriminate markets. Second, this research allows policymakers to promote equity in sittiadons where it is important to do so. For example, if policymakers dedde to act as a vanguard for isolated consumers, then analyses of interaction patterns and their distributional consequences is critical because it allows the measurement of harm both within and across consumer segments and suggests mechanisms for understanding differing market benefits or-costs accruing to informed and isolated segments.
Third, distributional effects research could be used to avoid significant unintended effects of regulation on the performance of the economic system. For example, information programs, in certain cases, could further separate segments of the market or lead to negative interactions among consumers, thereby worsening the circumstances of large numbers of consumers. Therefore, this framework makes dear how consumer and market problems will be affected by different poHcy remedies. As a result, we do not adhere to any one remedy as the only answer to consumer problems, but examine a wide range of policy options for a wide range of consumer and market problems. Therefore, this apprx>ach reveals the weaknesses, paradoxes, and Mades certain policy approaches and dedsions may have for both market effidency and consumer welfare.
Despite the potential contributions of this approach to policy remedy selection and implementation, there are major obstades to its use. Importantly, it imposes large data requirements on regulatory agendes and complicates rather than simplifies policy remedy choice. Another barrier lies in the fact that policy dedsions are currently made by different reguktory bodies with different agendas and at least historically, a distinct set of remedy options available for their use. Perfiaps a deeper analysis of the distributional effects of policy remedies will reveal the need for a greater mix of alternatives to be made available to a variety of regulatory bodies.
At a more subtle level, this approach imposes another cost It requires policymakers to abandon two comfortable illusions. One of these illusions is that costbenefit judgments are economic and not political or sodaL This paper suggests that aggregate cost-benefit analysis may differentially impact various segments of consumers with political and social repercussions.
Another illusion that policymakers must abandon is that the invisible hand of the market, when set into motion with market incentive-based government intervention, will correct market failure.^ As this paper suggests, market incentive-based government intervention may have limited effects when the market consists of negative and incomplete interactions. These maiket conditions require a more comprehensive segment by segment assessment of an intervention's effects. By moderating reliance on the market mechanism, policymakers will be forced to consider the characteristics of each intervention, the market conditions, and the interactions among individual consumer segments. These considerations will paint a richer and more realistic picture of policy effects.
From the policymaker's perspective, the scope of this paper is fairly narrow. For example, we do not address sefler issues in remedy selection and implementation, mduding issues of mcendve compatibility and cost structure [cf., Mazis et al. 1981] . Distributional effects of regulation may also unintentionally change the competitive advantages of firms and alter the structure and performance of an industry [Mitnick 1981] . And althou^ the distributional analyses proposed in this paper are designed to complement, rather than to replace aggregate cost-benefit analyses, we provide only cursory references to a total market effects orientation, focusing instead on where such an orientation is insuffident as a basis for policy remedy choice. Ftuthermore, the myriad of political issues within regulatory bodies that guide policy remedy choice and implementation are not here addressed [V^son 1980] . Nor does this paper discuss any policy remedy in detail, deliberate their pros and cons, or investigate remedy options in li^t of consumer processing limitations.^ Instead, this paper seeks to understand the complexity of policy remedy choices in lig^t of consumer segment interactions and their distributional consequences.
Notes
L Maricet £aihire is used to describe a breakdown of the self-reguhting properties usually ascribed the maricet mechanism (Elster 1986]. For a more conqdete discussion of types of market fafluie see the Federal 'Bade Commission Report on Consumer Infonnation Remedies [1979] . For an interesting discussion of the limitations of the market Mure concept see Bartlett [1978] .
2. We adcnowledge that althou^ economists have incorporated distributional considerations into cost-benefit analysis (e.g., public project selection [McGdre and Gam 1969] ), these issues have not been addressed specifically in the context of consumer policy.
3. The term externalities mi^t also be used to describe consumer interactions. An externality ejdsts whenever consuiiq)tion by one person affects consumption by another person. We prefer the term interaction hecause it focuses on the dynamics of consumer relationships, is not restricted to consumption-based interactions, and does not imply that externalities exist outside of the system [as the term 'a&malities' seems to].
4. These rights include the right to safety, the right to be informed, the ri^t to choose, and the rig^t to be h^rd [redress] . These ri^ts are the foundation for business and government polides designed to protect consumers' interests [Engel, Blackwell and Miniard 1986] .
5. Antitrust policy, wtidi may be a response to market structure inadequacies resulting in maricet £aihire, is not induded in this framework. Moreover, the range of potential national responses to the problem of negative externalities between countries (such as import barriers) is not addressed systematically. However, this franKwork can be extended to incorporate consumer problems that arise because of flows between nations.
6. This argument is elaborated in a discussion by Farris and Albion [1980] concerning the relationshq) between advertising and information.
7. The terms interaction and spillover are used interchangeably throu^^out this paper. Other typologies of interaction patterns are, of course, possible. For example, one reviewer noted that consumers could be divided into two groups: those who value infonnation and those who, for one reason or another, do not However, because many of the negative interactions described in this paper are consumption rather than information based, we chose not to adopt this framework.
8. The free-rider problem resulting firom the public good status of information can also be a source of market failure implying that too little pnxluct information will be produced (see Salop [1976] for a (fiscussion).
9. The required ratio of informed to uninformed consumers depends upon a myriad of other factors sudi as market-cost structure, consumer preferences for quality and total demand for the pnxluct or service [Schwartz and Wilde 1985] .
10. It could be argued that poficymakers have "learned" that the maricet mechanism often operates quite efBdently vi^en some fraction of the population stays informed and makes wiser choices. Although many programs were not designed with that objective, many conten^Mrary programs have that effect IL Often sellers wffl assist in creating this informed segment by drawing consumers' attention to unbiased third party information that favorably evaluates their products or services. 14. This analysis is also applicable to the mistake of treating the consumer and the buyer as synonymous. Increasing, the consumers yibo need product safety are not buyers but the users of a product somebody else bought [Nelson 1988 ].
15. Schwartz [1977] provides a detailed description of the legal standard for un&imess and its incorporation of issues such as "offending public policy."
16. Tb the extent that consumers vahie very different things their ability to understand, or empathize with one another is also likely to decrease. For a discussion of the important role of empathy in altruistic behavior see, for exanqde, Batson et aL [1983] and Krebs [1975] .
17. It is not the purpose of this paper to review the burgeoning literature on social choice, or to oversimplify the complexity of these problems. Excellent reviews of the social choice literature are available elsewhere [cf., Elster and HyDand 1986; Pattanaik and Salles 1983; Plott 1976; Sen 1985 ].
18. It should be noted that if a risk is viewed as sufficiently onerous, such that the costs to sodety deariy outweigh the benefits to the individual, policy remedies are likely to take a restrictive bent, regardless of the relative effectiveness of infonnation remedies. Alternatively, if the risk is viewed as low, such that the benefits to the individual appear to outweif^ the costs to sodety, information remedies may be employed despite a low probability of effectiveness.
19. In his work, Andreasen does not use the term "isolation." However his discussion of "disadvantaged" consumers is highly appropriate for dealing with consumer isolation. Being "disadvantaged" in Andreasen^ terminology is a form of consumer isolatioa 20. Andreasen [1986] summarizes the current stance of the FTC as one that presumes consumers can detect exploitation and will act on the information. Unfortunately, it is relatively well documented that the disadvantaged are both less likely to detect mistreatment and even ^en they detect mistreatment they are less likely to complain [Andreasen 1986, p. 123] .
21 A potential irony of this approach is that, if successful, education may change their preferences and circumstances sufSdently that they leave geographic markets they are being educated to correct Isolated consumers targeted with consumer education programs are also likely to be the targets of other education and job training programs designed to move them out of geographic markets. This may serve only to worsen the bt of those that remain (see Andreasen [1975] for a discussion of this problem). 
